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Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth 
(sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a 
certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a 
sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that 
sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having 
free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s 
preferred usage, it is part of the meaning of true that attribution of being true to a given 
thing presupposes the thing is a sentence. Beta’s importance is further highlighted by the 
fact that alpha can be satisfied using the recursively definable concept of being satisfied 
by every infinite sequence, which Tarski explicitly rejects. Moreover, in Definition 23, 
the famous truth-definition, Tarski supplements “being satisfied by every infinite 
sequence” by adding the condition “being a sentence”. Even where truth is undefinable 
and treated by Tarski axiomatically, he adds as an explicit axiom a sentence to the effect 
that every truth is a sentence. 
   Surprisingly, the sentence just before the presentation of Convention T seems to 
imply that alpha alone might be sufficient. Even more surprising is the sentence just after 
Convention T saying beta “is not essential”. Why include a condition if it is not essential? 
Tarski says nothing about this dissonance.  
  Considering the broader context, the Polish original, the German translation from which 
the English was derived, and other sources, we attempt to determine what Tarski might 
have intended by the two troubling sentences which, as they stand, are contrary to the 
spirit, if not the letter, of several other passages in Tarski’s corpus. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Philosophical logic … includes … epistemological problems, e. g. the problem 
of what is truth and whether there is any criterion of truth. Yet these matters … 
do not belong to logic … in which no reference whatever will be made to truth 
 2 
and falsehood. The problem of truth belongs to those epistemological issues 
which are extremely difficult … and probably will not be solved soon.—
Łukasiewicz 1929/1963, pp.7f 
 
This paper concerns Alfred Tarski’s English monograph “The concept of truth in 
formalized languages” (Tarski 1933/1956) first published in his collection (Tarski 1956). 
Central to the monograph is presentation and discussion of a certain one of the infinitely 
many definitions of the infinite class of true sentences of a certain interpreted first-order 
object language for the “calculus of classes”—specifically Definition 23 (1956, p.195).1 
He takes his construction of one particular truth definition for this one formalized 
language to exemplify a general abstract method applicable to many other formalized 
languages. His very words are instructive. 
 
I shall construct a definition of this kind in connexion with a particular concrete language and show some 
of its most important consequences. The indications which I shall then give in §4 of this article will, I hope, 
be sufficient to show how the method illustrated by this example can be applied to other languages of 
similar logical construction.—Tarski 1956, p.168 
 
Surprisingly, Tarski did not coin an abbreviated name for the language; thus 
necessitating repeated awkward locutions. We call it the Object Language of Classes, 
OLC. Among OLC’s expressions are certain strings2—devoid of free-variable 
occurrences—that have truth-values3 and are called sentences. Besides the variables, 
OLC contains negation, disjunction, the universal quantifier, and—as its only relation 
symbol—the “inclusion sign”. OLC has no other characters and in particular no 
expressions to serve as proper class names such as Boole’s ‘0’ and ‘1’. OLC uses Polish 
parenthesis free notation as opposed to Principia notation and thus, strictly speaking is 
not what had been called ‘the language of the calculus of classes’ or ‘the language of the 
logic of classes’. Moreover, it is not an algebraic language using function symbols such 
as plus and minus.   
Every sentence contains at least one occurrence of what Tarski calls inclusions: a string 
of three signs—an inclusion sign occurrence followed by two variable occurrences. In 
OLC’s “intuitive interpretation”, the variables range over the classes of individuals and 
                                                 
1
 As will become clear below, this is not—and could not have been—how Tarski stated one of his goals. 
His main goals are stated in several different ways and it is difficult to determine whether some or all are 
restatements of others. 
2
 In order to formalize his treatment of strings needed even for defining ‘sentence’, Tarski axiomatized 
string theory in 1933/1956 (Corcoran-Frank-Maloney 1974). Tarski’s 1956 word for “string” was the 
misleading word ‘expression’ (Tarski 1956, pp. 153, 166, 169, 172, 173). Of course, for Tarski an 
expression need not express anything; sentences do express but Tarski has no word for what is expressed 
by sentences—whether true or false. In later writings he seems to suggest that true sentences express “states 
of affairs”. Following Frege and Church (Corcoran 2009), we would say sentences express what are called 
‘propositions’—a word Tarski disliked and did not use in 1956. He preferred ‘sentential logic’ to 
‘propositional logic’, ‘sentential function’ to ‘propositional function’, etc.See Tarski 1944, p. 342. The now 
ubiquitous word ‘string’, meaning “concatenation of characters”, does not occur in 1933/1956 nor for that 
matter do ‘concatenation’ or ‘character’ in the syntactical sense (a point brought to our attention by Dr. 
Mary Mulhern, then of the University of Buffalo). However, in later writings Tarski used ‘string’ and 
‘concatenation’ in the required senses, e.g. 1983, p.174. 
3
 The expression ‘have truth-values’ must be understood as abbreviating ‘are either true or false’: Tarski 
studiously avoids using the expression ‘truth-values’ and he never discusses the ontological status of what 
other people call truth-values. 
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the inclusion sign is “equivalent in meaning” with the expression ‘is included in’. The 
universe of discourse contains all classes of “individuals” (1956, 168f). Every sentence is 
either true or false and no sentence is both. But Tarski does not use this current 
terminology.
4
 
The definition presented was discovered by Tarski; his priority claims have never been 
challenged. His task of presenting such a definition presupposes that the readers know 
what is meant by saying that a given expression of OLC is a true sentence.
5
 Tarski does 
not discuss how those sentences came to be, how they acquired truth-values, how the 
reader came to know of those sentences, or how the reader came to know what it means 
to say that such a sentence is true. Thus, Tarski’s task is neither stipulational nor 
instructional: his goal is not to stipulate a meaning for a previously meaningless 
expression nor is it to instruct anyone in the meaning of the expression to be defined. 
Tarski does not discuss how he came to select the language of the calculus of classes, 
or even which other languages he considered. However, his readers would have known 
that prominent logicians regarded it as one of the three branches of mathematical logic: 
e.g. “Considered as a formal calculus, mathematical logic has three analogous branches, 
namely (1) the calculus of propositions, (2) the calculus of classes, (3) the calculus of 
relations.”(Whitehead-Russell 1910, p. 88); also: “The subject of Symbolic Logic consists 
of three parts, the calculus of propositions, the calculus of classes, and the calculus of 
relations.” (Russell 1903, p. 11).6  
Tarski’s discussion uses, not in OLC of course, but in an unnamed metalanguage, 
we call the Metalanguage of Classes, MLC (1956, p.169ff). MLC contains a certain 
symbol ‘Tr’ in the grammatical category of class names. He also uses a third language: a 
metalanguage of MLC containing the two-character symbol ‘Tr’ but also containing the 
four-character quotes-name of ‘Tr’, namely ‘ ‘Tr’ ’. Today’s readers must continually 
remind themselves that MLC and the formalized languages Tarski discusses are all 
thoroughly interpreted. 
 
It remains perhaps to add that we are not interested here in formal languages and sciences in one special 
sense of the word 'formal': namely sciences to the signs and expressions of which no material sense is 
attached. For such sciences the problem here discussed has no relevance, it is not even meaningful. 
                                                 
4
 Although Tarski never says so in, even in  1983, a modern reader would notice that OLC can be 
reinterpreted by assigning a new universe of discourse and a new meaning for the relation symbol. Thus, it 
can be transformed into a language for set theory, for number theory, for geometry [e.g. the geometry of 
line segments in Tarski 1941], or even for string theory. Thus, OLC can be taken as a paradigm example of 
a relational language. However, in 1933/1956 Tarski takes OLC to be a fragment of a higher-order 
language and in particular where the variables are dedicated class variables. 
5
 Today we would say that negation, disjunction, and the universal quantifier are logical constants and that 
the relation symbol—the “inclusion sign”—is non-logical or descriptive. However, it would be awkward, to 
say the least, for Tarski to use this terminology because he regards the calculus of classes as a “fragment of 
mathematical logic” (1956, 168). Moreover, we would refer to the variables as individual variables but this 
would be awkward for Tarski as they are dedicated class variables. Alternative interpretations are never 
under consideration by Tarski. By the way, Tarski 1956 never says that the variables range over classes; his 
unvarying locution is “the variables represent names of classes of individuals” (1956, 169, 249). This is 
despite the fact that OLC has no such names—a fact Tarski conveniently does not mention. 
6
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the important and often puzzling role in Tarski’s thought 
over the years of “the calculus of classes” and similar systems. Sometimes they are logics in which truth 
coincides with logical truth, but sometimes they are in effect first-order theories where the logical truths 
(tautologies, in the broad sense) form a proper subset of the truths.  
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—Tarski 1933/1956, p.166. 
 
Moreover, the possibility of reinterpreting them is out of the question—not only in the 
truth-definition paper (Tarski 1933/1956) but also, perhaps surprisingly, in the famous 
consequence-definition paper (Tarski 1936/1956b and 1936/2002) as documented in 
(Corcoran-Sagüillo 2011).
7
 The symbol ‘Tr’ denotes the set of true sentences of OLC. 
Perhaps, to explicitly recognize language-relativity, it would be better to say something 
like the following: The symbol ‘Tr’ denotes the set of expressions of OLC that are true-
in-OLC.  In particular, MLC contains infinitely many sentences having a certain 
definitional form with the symbol ‘Tr’ as the definiendum. 
 
For every expression x, x є Tr if and only if […]. 
 
In accordance with Tarski’s terminology, as misleading as it maybe to those not 
accustomed to it, we call such a sentence—with an MLC formula devoid of occurrences 
of the symbol ‘Tr’ (to avoid circularity8) and having only x free on the right as 
definiens—a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’.9 Such a sentence is thus a definition of the 
symbol ‘Tr’ regardless of what formula is on the right provided the formula on the right 
does not contain any free occurrence of a variable other than x and is devoid of ‘Tr’. We 
considered putting cautionary quotes around ‘definition’ in such contexts but thought that 
such a precaution would create other difficulties. It is instructive to see the example 
Tarski gives, viz. Definition 23 (Tarski 1933/1956, p.195). Following standard practice in 
mathematics, Tarski leaves it to the reader to supply ‘for every expression x’: the initial 
universal-quantifier phrase.
10
 The symbol ‘S’ denotes the class of sentences of OLC. 
 
Definition 23. x is a true sentence—in symbols x є Tr—if and only if x є S and every infinite 
sequence of classes satisfies x. 
 
Restoring the omission and deleting the clutter would produce something like the 
following. 
 
Definition 23*. For every expression x, x є Tr if and only if x є S and every infinite sequence of 
classes satisfies x. 
 
                                                 
7
 The currently popular idea—that the difference between logical and non-logical constants is that the 
former have “fixed meanings” but the latter have “variable meanings”—has no place in pre-WWII logic. It 
seems to be based on failures to distinguish artifacts of modern formulations of mathematical logic from 
features of logical phenomena perceived by logicians as far back as Aristotle and the Stoics. 
8
 Of course, such a pre-sentence would also have to be devoid of ‘true sentence’, which Tarski takes to be 
an exact synonym of ‘Tr’. 
9
 As exasperating as it may be to find this out, we must tell our readers that Tarski never defines definition 
of the symbol ‘Tr’. Incidentally any string of that form having a variable other than ‘x’ free on the right 
would not be a sentence and thus would not be a definition of ‘Tr’ in this sense.    
10
 Tarski’s introductory logic book 1941/1994 repeatedly emphasizes this point, but we have not found it in 
1933/1956. Incidentally, such omissions routinely made by mathematicians tend to annoy logicians. Martin 
Davis, a mathematician who is also a logician, compromised by using the semi-colon to abbreviate the 
string of universal quantifiers omitted in the order they would normally occur. Thus, ‘: xy = yx’ could 
abbreviate ‘for every number x, for every number y: xy = yx’. Thus, the semi-colon between the quantifier 
phrase and the formula it governs is made to stand for itself preceded by the quantifier phrase. 
 5 
 To see why we take the range indicator to be ‘expression’—and not say ‘object’—
see the first paragraph of page 173 in 1933/1956. But since Tarski does not consistently 
keep to the convention stated there, we cannot be sure of our choice: e. g. see 1933/1956, 
pp.190 where the variable a—allegedly restricted to classes—is used with a wider or at 
least different range.
11
 
Tarski’s Definition 23 is a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ that is true. Perhaps we 
should say true-in-MLC as opposed to true-in-OLC. Definition 23 is a true sentence of 
MLC—a true definition of the symbol ‘Tr’. The following are false definitions of the 
symbol ‘Tr’, definitions of the symbol ‘Tr’ that are false, thus, false sentences of MLC. 
 
 For every expression x, x є Tr if and only if x is identical with x. 
For every expression x, x є Tr if and only if x is not identical with x. 
  
This terminology almost violates normal standards of English usage: an English speaker 
not informed of the strange usage would be inclined to say that neither of the displayed 
sentences is a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’.12 
It is worth noting that 1933/1956 has two definitions of the symbol ‘Tr’, the 
semantical Definition 23 and a structural definition called Theorem 28 on page 208. 
 
Theorem 28: In order that x ε Tr, it is necessary and sufficient that x is a […]. 
 
But at first Tarski does not call this a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’; he says that because 
of its form it could be regarded as such a definition. On the next page he does explicitly 
call it a definition. 
Even more confusing is the fact that sometimes the expression definition of the 
symbol is redundantly lengthened by Tarski to formally correct definition of the symbol, 
methodologically correct definition of the symbol , or just correct definition of the symbol  
(1956, pp. 188, 406, and 246 respectively].
13
 It is difficult to become accustomed to the 
fact that these extending expressions are mere fillers or expletives not used to attribute 
any material significance (Corcoran 2003, p. 266). However, other similar expressions 
are used to restrict the class of definitions to those which “work”, in senses to be 
discussed below. 
                                                 
11
 Even more troubling is the last full sentence on p. 187 of 1933/1956, where Tarski begins to discuss 
strengthening condition alpha. There he refers to “[…] sentences of the type ‘x is not a true sentence’, in 
which in the place of ‘x’ we have the name of an arbitrary expression (or any other object)[…]”. Taken 
literally, this is astounding, perhaps incoherent. We have here one more indication that more research is 
need before 1933/1956 can be regarded as understood. 
12
 This ignores the strange fact that logicians tend to use ‘is identical with [to]’ for “is the same thing as” in 
contexts where normal speakers would say ‘is’. In normal English, ‘is identical with’ most often means 
“different but very similar”: Corcoran’s copy of Tarski 1956 is identical to Weber’s. Tarski almost always 
says ‘is identical with [to]’ for “is the same thing as”, but the simple ‘is’ does appear in the identity sense in 
1956, p.194, footnote 1. Of course, the logicians are concerned—often uselessly—to avoid the 
identity/predication ambiguity of ‘is’, but their misguided attempts to avoid one ambiguity lands them in 
another. Incidentally, it is to Tarski’s credit that in 1933/1956, he never says ‘equal’ for ‘is’ of identity, 
except of course in connection with numbers, which is so entrenched it is hard to avoid without appearing 
pedantic, or worse. 
13
 As an indication that formally correct, methodologically correct, and correct are empty redundant 
rhetoric or filler preceding definition of the symbol, one can observe that Tarski never mentions definitions 
of the symbol ‘Tr’ that are not formally correct, methodologically correct, or correct.  
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In the case that the symbol ‘Tr’ were to be regarded as meaningless, each definition 
of the symbol ‘Tr’ could be said to assign to ‘Tr’ a class of expressions, viz. the class of 
expressions that satisfy the formula on the right […]. For example, the above two assign 
respectively the universal class and the null class. 
A definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ can be called a definition of the class X if it assigns X 
to the symbol ‘Tr’. However, it would be absurd to try to assign a class to the symbol ‘Tr’ 
if it already had a class assigned to it—as in Tarski’s case. 
Tarski does not use the terminology italicized in the last paragraph; but he does 
imply, e.g. that the expression ‘x is not identical with x’ defines the null property and the 
expression ‘x is x’ defines the universal property (1956, 194). However, he never says 
why ‘property’ is used instead of ‘class’ or what he takes to be the relation of classes to 
properties. Tarski does not reserve ‘class’ for the entities referred to in the language of 
classes, OLC. He uses ‘class’ routinely for aggregates of objects of various sorts such as 
expressions and numbers. In this context, it would be natural to say that the expression ‘x 
is not identical with x’ is a definition of the null class and the expression ‘x is identical 
with x’ is a definition of the universal class but Tarski does not say such things in 
1933/1956. 
 Of course, in the sense introduced above, no definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ endows 
‘Tr’ with meaning. Unless ‘Tr’ has previously been endowed with meaning, none of the 
definitions is a meaningful sentence in Tarski’s sense. If ‘Tr’ is considered an 
uninterpreted symbol, then the definitions of ‘Tr’ must be considered as formal sentences 
lacking truth-values. However, anticipating this situation in the preamble to Convention 
T, Tarski endowed ‘Tr’ with meaning. Tarski explicitly took “the symbol ‘Tr’ to denote 
the class of all true sentences” (1933/1956, p.187). By ‘true sentence’, Tarski meant “true 
sentence of OLC”. Notice that in defining the symbol ‘Tr’, i.e. in endowing the symbol 
‘Tr’ with meaning, Tarski was not giving a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ in the above 
sense, although using normal English it would be perverse to deny that Tarski gave a 
definition of the symbol ‘Tr’. 
 Once the symbol ‘Tr’ is meaningful, every definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ becomes 
a meaningful sentence in MLC and thus has a truth-value. One might be inclined to say 
that many, even most, of them are false. However, since there is a countable infinity of 
truths among them, ‘most’ cannot be used literally here. Anyway, all of those that are true 
are definitions of the class of true sentences (of OLC): each of them would assign to the 
symbol ‘Tr’ the class of true sentences (of OLC)—which is exactly what Tarski took ‘Tr’ 
to denote. The definitions of the symbol ‘Tr’ that “work” are those that are true. But 
Tarski never says this—perhaps because he does not want to use the word ‘true’ in the 
meta-metalanguage. It would be natural to use the expression  
 
materially adequate definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ 
 
to refer to a formally correct definition that happens to be true. Tarski does not seem to 
grasp this point: he never warns the reader that being true is not sufficient for being 
materially adequate in his sense.
14
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 Corcoran—in 1999 and elsewhere—mistakenly thought that ‘materially adequate’ meant “true” and that 
convention T was establishing a test for determining the truth of a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’. 
 7 
 Notice that whether such a definition is true has nothing to do with the deductive 
apparatus of the metatheory—the non-logical axioms and the logical axioms and rules of 
inference. This point, which is obvious enough in itself, follows from the discussion of 
definability-in-a-model in the Editor’s Introduction to Tarski 1956/1983.15 Why doesn’t 
Tarski mention this fact? Does he have something to lose were this point clearly stated? 
Would it raise problems he wanted to avoid treating? Perhaps the fact that the truth of a 
definition is independent even of the existence of the deductive apparatus of the 
metatheory is so obvious to Tarski that he does not see fit to mention it. If this is so, he is 
insensitive to the needs of his readers. 
 It would be natural to call a formally correct definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ 
materially correct, adequate, or materially adequate if it is true, i.e. if it assigns to ‘Tr’ 
the class of true sentences. Indeed, this usage occurs often in the literature (Audi 1999, p. 
540). However, one should not jump to the conclusion that a usage that would be natural 
today is what Tarski would have used over 75 years ago. In this regard, it is important to 
note that if Tarski had meant to call true definitions of symbols materially adequate he 
could easily have done so. We will see reasons below why that meaning was not used by 
Tarski 1933/ 1956. Anyway it becomes clear that by calling a definition materially 
adequate, Tarski was not merely saying that it was true, i.e. that the extension it would 
assign to the symbol ‘Tr’ would be the class of true sentences of OLC. Similar or closely 
related points appear in recent literature, e.g. Patterson 2012, p. 110. 
 Tarski’s Convention T—which presents his notion of adequate definition of truth 
(sic)
16—contains two conditions, alpha and beta, that are separately necessary and jointly 
sufficient (Tarski 1933/1956, pp. 187–8). The two-condition notion presented is also 
called material adequacy (loc. cit., pp. 209, 265, and 273) and material correctness (loc. 
cit., pp. 195, 197, 230, and 246) elsewhere.   
 Alpha requires in effect that all instances of a T Schema
17
 be provable—a 
condition elsewhere also called material adequacy (Tarski 1936/1956a, p. 404; Tarski 
1944, pp. 343ff., p. 353).   
 Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally 
recognizes the fact repeatedly emphasized by Tarski that sentences—as opposed to pre-
sentences having free occurrences of variables—exhaust the range of significance of the 
predicate is true.
18
 Figuratively speaking, we might put this by saying that for Tarski it is 
                                                 
15
 Tarski read and commented on several drafts of Corcoran’s Editor’s Introduction. He finally approved 
what was printed. Tarski would never have permitted a technical inaccuracy to be printed in the new edition 
of Tarski 1956. He did write that he did “not always agree with Corcoran’s judgments”—referring to 
Corcoran’s interpretations of the historical development of Tarski’s thinking (1956/1983, p. xiv). 
16
 Is Tarski stipulating what is henceforth to be meant by adequate definition of truth? That is, is he 
regarding this expression as a previously meaningless unitary formula better written as one hyphenated 
word adequate-definition-of-truth so that it can be given a meaning? Or is he asserting (“postulating”) a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a definition of truth to be adequate, assuming that the reader knows 
what adequate definition of truth means? See also e.g. Tarski, A. 1931/1956, p. 118; Tarski, 1933/1956, p. 
194n; Corcoran 1999.  But we set these problems to the side for the moment. 
17
 Specifically, ‘x ε Tr if and only if p’ is the schema template and the side condition requires ‘x’ to be 
replaced by a structural-descriptive name of a sentence of the object-language while ‘p’ is replaced by a 
translation of that sentence into the metalanguage. See Corcoran 2006. The instances of the schema are 
metalanguage sentences. Convention T is an italicized meta-metalanguage sentence.  
18
 What we call pre-sentences Tarski calls sentential functions containing “free variables”. In Tarski’s 
framework, there is no such thing as a free variable, strictly speaking. He means to refer to free occurrences 
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part of the meaning of true that attribution of true to a given thing presupposes the thing 
is a sentence (Tarski 1933/1956, pp. 186–7–8, 195–7; Tarski 1941/1946, pp. 4 and 11, 
Tarski 1969/1993, pp. 101ff.).  
 The essential necessity of beta—and that alpha alone is not sufficient—is 
highlighted by several other facts. Perhaps the simplest is that Tarski’s stated problem is 
“the construction of the (sic) definition of true sentence”, which uses ‘sentence’ (Tarski 
1933/1956, p. 186).
19
 Another is the fact that Convention T’s preamble introduces the 
definiendum’s symbol as denoting the class of true sentences. His exact words are: 
“Using the symbol ‘Tr’ to denote the class of all true sentences, the above postulate can 
be expressed in the following convention” (loc. cit.). Still another is the fact that alpha is 
satisfied by the recursively definable concept of being satisfied by every infinite 
sequence, which Tarski emphatically rejects as inadequate (Tarski 1933/1956, p.189) and 
which he supplements adding the condition of being a sentence in the famous truth-
definition (Tarski 1933/1956, p.195). He stresses the point that “composite sentences are 
in no way compounds of simple sentences” and that therefore no recursive definition of 
true sentence is possible (Tarski 1933/1956, p.189; Tarski 1944, p. 353). It is worth 
quoting the 1933/1956 passage. 
 
In general, composite sentences are in no way compounds of simple sentences. Sentential functions do in 
fact arise in this way from elementary functions, i.e. from inclusions; sentences on the contrary are certain 
special cases of sentential functions. In view of this fact, no method can be given which would enable us to 
define the required concept directly by recursive means. 
 
 The final reason we cite underlining the essential nature of condition beta is that 
even where truth is undefinable and treated by Tarski axiomatically, he adds as an 
explicit axiom a sentence to the effect that every truth is a sentence. This point is made in 
italics in Theorem III (Tarski 1933/1956, p.256). 
 It should also be mentioned that the sentences alpha requires to be provable are 
provable simply by adding to the metatheory, not a definition of the symbol Tr, but a 
variant of sentence (5) on page 159. However, that would not satisfy beta. 
 In our introductory remarks, which avoid symbols, we said that beta requires in 
effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’ in order to avoid making beta appear to 
be requiring provability of a tautology—which it does not. However, in Tarski’s 
metalanguage—which includes part of ordinary English—two ways of expressing beta’s 
sentence using Tarski’s own locutions are as follows.20 
 
every true sentence is a sentence 
                                                                                                                                                 
of variables. Sentences are sentential functions not containing “free variables”. This point is especially 
important in Tarski 1933/1956, p. 194. See also e.g. Tarski 1944, pp. 353-4. However, In Tarski 1941/1946, 
on p. 5 sentential functions must contain free variable occurrences and hence no sentence is a sentential 
function. 
19
 The italics are Tarski’s. Incidentally, it is extremely unlikely in our opinion that by ‘the definition […]’ 
Tarski meant to imply that there is only one, or even only one that is true. Since Polish has no definite 
article, the occurrence of ‘the’ traces back to a translator. We leave open the further question of whether 
Tarski ever explicitly stated or even implied that there are infinitely many true sentences of MLC that are 
definitions of  the symbol ‘Tr’. 
20
 Following Tarski’s meticulous style, we put sentences in clausal form—no initial uppercase and no 
period. See Corcoran 2006, pp. 226f and Corcoran 2009. 
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every object that is a true sentence is a sentence 
 
Each is an apparent tautology. In Tarski’s variable-enhanced English, the range of the 
variable ‘x’ includes the class of strings of characters used in the object language. 
Another Tarskian way of expressing beta’s sentence, using the variable, is  
 
for every object x, if x is a true sentence, then x is a sentence 
  
—another apparent tautology. The reason none of these are tautologies for Tarski is that 
he takes ‘true sentence’ to be a unitary non-compound expression without separately 
significant parts, a point that might be brought out by writing ‘true-sentence’ or better 
‘truesentence’. Taking ‘true sentence’ and ‘sentence’ to be class names abbreviated 
respectively ‘Tr’ and ‘S’, Tarski gives two ways of expressing beta’s sentence in his 
presentation of Convention T.
21
 
 
for any x, if x ε Tr, then x ε S 
Tr ⊆ S 
 
 The fact that Convention T has two conditions and not just one is mentioned 
several times, twice on page 246 of Tarski 1933/1956.
22
  
 Paradoxically, in the English translation, the sentence just before the presentation 
of Convention T seems to imply that alpha might be sufficient. Even more paradoxical is 
the sentence just after Convention T: it says beta “is not essential”. Why include a 
condition if it is not essential? He says nothing about this apparent dissonance. We look 
at the broader context, the Polish original, and the German translation from which the 
English was derived. We also consider other sources to determine what Tarski might 
have intended by the two troubling sentences which, as they stand, are contrary to the 
spirit, if not the letter, of several other passages in Tarski’s corpus (Tarski 1933/1956, 
Tarski 1941/1946, Tarski 1969/1993, and elsewhere). 
 Some current writers hold that beta is unnecessary. Patterson 2012, on p. 124, 
while not explicitly dismissing beta, states that alpha is sufficient. However, Horsten 
2011 not only says in effect that beta is not essential, but on p. xx he cites the Tarski 
passage as authority. Horsten gives absolutely no reason why he regards beta as “not 
essential”; he does not explain what he means by saying beta is not essential; nor does he 
say how omitting beta contributes to his own project.
23
 
 
                                                 
21
 Tarski 1933/1956 does not comment on the fact that he regards ‘true sentence’ as a single word with no 
independent meaning given to the separate parts ‘true’ and ‘sentence’. However, he does comment on using 
quote-names as unitaries not containing the expressions named on page 159. He also discusses taking ‘it is 
not true that’ as a single unitary expression wherein ‘true’ has no independent meaning on page 169.  Other 
expressions regarded as unitary include the following: ‘for all’, ‘is a’, ‘is identical with’, ‘is included in’, 
‘provable sentence’, ‘free variable’, ‘universal quantification’, and, arguably, ‘adequate definition of truth’. 
22
 As mentioned above, the property set forth in Convention T is not always referred to using ‘adequate 
definition of truth’: on the just mentioned page, ‘correct definition of truth’ is used and so is ‘material 
correctness’. 
23
 These points were not mentioned in any of the several reviews of Horsten 2011 published before 2014. 
They are not even mentioned in Corcoran’s critical notice (Corcoran 2012) nor are they are found in the 
scathing Corcoran-Masoud 2014.  
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2. Range of significance of  ‘is true’ 
 
To say that “snow is white” is, for the ends of logic, equivalent to saying that 
“snow is a white thing”.—George Boole 1854/2003, p. 52. 
To say that “snow is white” is true is, for Alfred Tarski, equivalent to saying that 
“snow is white” is a true sentence.—Frango Nabrasa 2014, personal 
communication. 
 
 The notion of range of significance belongs to semantics in Tarski’s sense and it is 
intimately connected to his notion of semantic category. The range of significance of a 
predicate is the class of objects of which the predicate can be coherently affirmed or 
denied. This means that a predicate can be truly or falsely affirmed or denied only of the 
objects in its range of significance. If it is affirmed or denied of something else the 
resulting sentence is incoherent. In terms borrowed from the wider literature, each 
sentential function having one free variable determines three sets of objects: 1) those 
satisfying it, its truth set; 2) those satisfying its negation, its falsity set; 3) those satisfying 
it or its negation, its range of significance (Whitehead-Russell 1910, p. 199) or range of 
values (Whitehead-Russell 1910, p. 15). The notion is introduced in Appendix B of 
Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics, §497 (Russell 1903). 
 For example, the predicate ‘exceeds seven’ can be truly affirmed of any number 
exceeding seven and truly denied of any other number—but affirming or denying it of , 
say, the sun or Tarski,  results in incoherence. The following two sentences express 
incoherent meanings. 
  
The sun exceeds seven. 
It is not the case that the sun exceeds seven. 
 
The sun is not the sort of thing that can coherently be said to exceed seven or not 
exceed seven. 
 In order to determine that a sentence expresses a coherent message it is not 
necessary to known that it is true or that it is false: understanding its meaning is 
necessary and often sufficient. Likewise, to determine that a sentence expresses an 
incoherent message understanding its meaning is necessary and often sufficient. In one 
broad sense of ‘meaningful”—i.e. “having a meaning”—incoherent sentences are 
meaningful as are coherent sentences of course: it is by dint of their meanings that we 
determine that they are incoherent. Using a handy variant of the Frege-Church 
terminology, we can say that the two sentences above containing ‘sun’ have meanings 
but neither meaning is a proposition (Corcoran 2009). 
 When Tarski says in effect that the sentences of a given language form the range 
of significance of the languages truth predicate, he means coherent sentences (1944, p. 
342). He often says “meaningful sentence” where it would be preferable to say 
coherent sentence. There are obvious senses of meaningful in which ‘the sun exceeds 
seven’ is perfectly meaningful and through grasping its pathological meaning we see 
that it is incoherent. 
 When a predicate is used in an atomic sentential function or pre-sentence such as 
‘x exceeds seven’, its range of significance is the range of values of the variable. This 
ties into the fact that the range of significance of the negation of a predicate—here ‘it is 
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not the case that x exceeds seven’ or more idiomatically ‘x doesn’t exceed seven’—is 
the same as that of the predicate itself. Whatever can be coherently affirmed of a given 
thing can coherently be denied of it, and conversely. 
 It is evident from Definition 23 that for Tarski the range of significance of the 
predicate ‘is a true sentence’ is the entire universe of discourse of the intended 
interpretation of the metalanguage, i.e., the range of values of the individual variable 
‘x’. See Tarski 1933/1956, pp. 173, 195. 
 The extension of a predicate is the subset of objects in its range of significance 
that it is predicable truly of.  The extension of a class name is the class it names. In 
Tarski 1933/1956, the extension of ‘is a true sentence’ is the class of true object 
language sentences. 
 As said above, in Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of the meaning of true that 
attribution of being true to a given thing presupposes the thing is a sentence. In terms of 
this paper, Tarski took the set of sentences of OLC to be the range of significance of 
‘true’, or ‘is true’. To see this preference in other contexts see Tarski 1936, Tarski 
1944, and Tarski 1969 where the analogues to the T schema use ‘true’ as a predicate 
adjective as in ‘is true’ and not as an attributive adjective modifying ‘sentence’ as in ‘is 
a true sentence’. In these three places ‘is true’ amounts to ‘is a true sentence’. 
 
 
 
3. Convention T in context 
 
In the long history of this text, even what is obvious has often been overlooked. 
—Norman Kretzmann on a passage in the Organon, Buffalo, 1972. 
 
This section contains verbatim Tarski’s presentation of Convention T together with 
the preceding two sentences and the following sentence, which will be referred to as such 
in the commentary to follow in the next section. The rest of this section contains Tarski’s 
exact words (Tarski 1933/1956, pp. 186–187). 
 
Not much more in principle is to be demanded of a general definition of true sentence than that it should 
satisfy the usual conditions of methodological correctness and include all partial definitions of this type 
as special cases; that it should be, so to speak, their logical product. At most we can also require that 
only sentences are to belong to the extension of the defined concept, so that, on the basis of the 
definition constructed, all sentences of the type ‘x is not a true sentence’, in which in the place of ‘x’ we 
have the name of an arbitrary expression (or of any other object) which is not a sentence, can be proved. 
 
Using the symbol ‘Tr’ to denote the class of all true sentences, the above postulate can be expressed 
in the following convention: 
CONVENTION T. A formally correct definition of the symbol ‘Tr’, formulated in the metalanguage, 
will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has the following consequences: 
(α) all the sentences which are obtained from the expression ‘x є Tr if and only if p’ by substituting 
for the symbol ‘x’ a structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the 
symbol ‘p’ the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into the metalanguage; 
(β) the sentence ‘for any x, if x є Tr then x є S’ (in other words ‘Tr  S’). 
 
    It should be noted that the second part of the above convention is not essential; so long as the 
metalanguage already has the symbol ‘Tr’ which satisfies the condition (α), it is easy to define a new 
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symbol ‘Tr´’ which also satisfies the condition (β). It suffices for this purpose to agree that Tr´ is the 
common part of the classes Tr and S. 
 
4. Commentary on the English edition 
 
In […] the case of the monograph on the concept of truth […], the translation 
had to be based not upon the original, […] Polish, but upon the […] German 
version. This made it even harder for the translator to give a fully adequate 
rendering of the original intentions and ideas of the author. In addition, […] the 
translator was deprived of the benefit of extensively discussing with the author 
even the major difficulties […], and so achieving a meeting of minds before the 
text as set up in type.—Alfred Tarski 1956, p. x 
 
 
 To understand the immediately relevant implications of Tarski’s “preceding two 
sentences”, it is convenient to omit certain temporarily extraneous words. 
 
Not much more […] is to be demanded of a […] definition of true sentence than that it should […] 
include all partial definitions of this type […]. At most we can also require that only sentences are to 
belong to the extension of the defined concept […]. 
  
 The first sentence says “not much more […] than” condition alpha is needed. This 
implies that something more is needed. The second sentence implies that condition beta 
is at least as strong as that something more, i.e., that beta would be a sufficient 
supplement to alpha. Note that it does not strictly speaking imply that the full strength 
of beta is necessary. Moreover, the expression “at most we can also require” implies 
awareness that the adding of requirements can be overdone: an exact balance is being 
sought. 
 Now with this conclusion in mind, we consider the immediately relevant 
implications of Tarski’s “following sentence”, again omitting certain temporarily 
extraneous words. 
 
[…] the second part of the above convention is not essential; so long as the metalanguage […] 
satisfies the condition (α), it is easy to define a new symbol ‘Tr´’ which also satisfies the condition 
(β). […] to agree that Tr´ is the common part of the classes Tr and S. 
 
If the first clause is taken to say that beta is not essential, i.e. that it can be dropped 
without interfering with the concept of adequacy being defined, then the second clause is 
a blatant non sequitur. There is no way that the defining of a new symbol satisfying beta 
could possibly show that beta is not essential—in the relevant sense. 
 Something is wrong here.
24
 Either there must be an error in our interpretation of 
‘essential’, or there was a mistranslation somewhere, or Tarski’s attention lapsed 
momentarily. The last possibility will be explored in a later section. The second 
possibility will be considered in the next section. Other problems with this passage have 
been discussed above in Section 1. 
                                                 
24
 Corcoran, the senior author of this paper, must have read these two pages (pp. 186–187) of Tarski 
1933/1956 dozens of times. But he never noticed that anything was amiss until reading the Horsten 2011 
citation on page 49, where these passages are alleged to “justify” Horsten’s erroneous application of truth 
to pre-sentences.  For more on Horsten 2011, see Corcoran 2012. 
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4.1 Tarski’s postulate 
 
 Immediately following the below quote, Tarski wrote “the above postulate can be 
expressed in the following convention”. We seem justified, therefore, in calling the 
proposition expressed by this two-sentence paragraph Tarski’s Postulate. How a postulate 
can be a convention is a problem demanding attention.  
 
Not much more in principle is to be demanded of a general definition of true sentence than that it should 
satisfy the usual conditions of methodological correctness and include all partial definitions of this type as 
special cases; that it should be, so to speak, their logical product. At most we can also require that only 
sentences are to belong to the extension of the defined concept, so that, on the basis of the definition 
constructed, all sentences of the type ‘x is not a true sentence’, in which in the place of ‘x’ we have the 
name of an arbitrary expression (or of any other object) which is not a sentence, can be proved. 
 
Tarski (1933/1956, p.187) is saying that this paragraph “can be expressed in” Convention 
T. We can wonder what relation Tarski has in mind by “can be expressed in”. We can 
also wonder how we are meant to understand ‘postulate’. How does a postulate differ 
from an axiom? Incidentally, contrary to certain recent writers, Tarski takes ‘axiom’ 
pretty much in a traditional sense: when he calls a sentence an axiom, it is clear that he 
thinks that it is true, that he thinks he knows that it is true, and that it is suitable to be used 
in proofs of other sentences.  
 This being the case, it goes without saying that all of the expressions in an axiom 
are understood. If a postulate is a kind of axiom, or if ‘postulate’ is a stylistic variant of 
‘axiom’, then ‘adequate’ must be understood before a sentence containing it could be 
postulated, i.e. taken as a postulate. 
 In this connection it is important to remember that, for Tarski, simply having all 
objective properties of an axiom is not sufficient for a sentence to be an axiom: it must be 
subjectively selected for axiomatic service. Moreover, that selection is subjective, as 
Tarski emphasizes in 1933/1956 and thus it is entirely appropriate for him to use the word 
‘convention’ in this connection. Patterson 2012 has some discussion of Tarski’s use of 
‘convention’. 
 
 
5. Commentary on the German and Polish editions 
 
If you by your rules would measure what with your rules doth not agree, 
forgetting all your learning, seek ye first what its rules may be.  
   —Richard Wagner, Die Meistersinger. 
 
 
5.1 Preliminary remarks: the “Tarski-Blaustein-Woodger triangle” 
 
The widely studied Woodger 1956 English edition of Tarski’s monograph on truth is a 
translation of Leopold Blaustein’s 1935 German rendering of the Polish original text, 
which appeared as a book in 1933. It is, thus, a translation of a translation. Not, to be 
sure, a mere translation, because, as is well known, Tarski himself thoroughly revised 
Woodger’s version (in both the first, Woodger’s, and second, Corcoran’s, editions), 
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   T33                                                      W56 
 B35 
rewrote and added some footnotes, and endorsed the final text we are nowadays 
acquainted with.
25
 Nevertheless, in spite of his personal collaboration in preparing the 
English edition, the fact still remains that, in the end, The Concept of Truth in Formalized 
Languages is a translation―a translation of a translation―and this obviously introduces 
some intricacies when interpretive issues come to the fore.
 26
   
Actually, one might argue that Tarski’s rewriting/revising work on Woodger’s version, 
although valuable in many respects, had the unintended effect of making things 
somewhat convoluted from a historical and exegetical point of view. To further 
complicate matters, just as the English edition is not an exact rendition of the source 
paper in German, so also Blaustein’s version is not an exact translation of the Polish 
original dissertation. Tarski revised, expanded and edited it too, making things a little bit 
more complicated for the historically-minded reader. Strictly speaking, what is usually 
referred to as “Tarski’s truth-definition paper” is, when one looks into the details, a 
moderately intricate object of study consisting of three non (exactly) overlapping texts—
an object that might be pictorially displayed as the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure might be called the “Tarski-Blaustein-Woodger triangle” (TBW, for short). 
[Notation for vertices is self-explanatory. Arrows indicate translation from one vertex to 
the other, and the dotted line indicates absence of direct translation.]
27
  
There are some differences in content between the vertices of TBW.
28
 The main, well-
known difference between T33 and B35 is an eleven pages postscript added to the latter 
                                                 
 
 
 
25
 See Corcoran, John. “Editor’s preface to the revised edition”, Woodger, J. H., “Translator’s preface”, and 
Tarski, “Author’s  acknowledgments”, Tarski 1956/1983.  For more details, especially related to errors and 
misprints, see Corcoran 2013: “Errors in Tarski’s 1983 truth-definition paper”. 
26
 Tarski’s book—Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych―appeared as number 34 of the Travaux 
de la Société des Sciences et de Lettres de Varsovie (Classe III – Sciences Mathématiques et Physiques). 
Blaustein’s translation—Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen―appeared in the first 
number of the Polish international journal Studia Philosophica. In order to avoid unnecessary complication, 
we did not mention the early, unpublished 1931 version of Tarski’s book—Pojęcie prawdy w naukach 
dedukcyjnych―which was scheduled to appear in the volume XXIV of the Comptes Rendus des Séances de 
la Société des Sciences et de Lettres de Varsovie (Classe III – Sciences Mathématiques et Physiques). The 
unpublished version is mentioned twice in Tarski 1933/1956 (p. 152 [Bibliographical Note] and p. 247 
[footnote 1]). As for its title and scheduled publication, see Sur les ensembles définissables des nombres 
réels (footnote 2, pp. 211-2). 
27
 We are deliberately ignoring here translations into languages other than English, since most of them 
derive from Woodger’s edition, and also because of the pervasive utilization of that edition by students and 
scholars. But we are aware that Blaustein’s version has also been directly translated into other tongues―for 
instance, there is the Italian 1961 rendition of B36 by Francesca Rivetti Barbò, Il concetta di verità nei 
linguaggi formalizzati. Even so, W56 has a special place among all the translations, in virtue of Tarski’s 
direct involvement in preparing corrections and additions for it although he was unable to make extensive 
changes in the final proof sheet before publication (Tarski 1956, Translator’s Preface). 
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text, the Nachwort, derogating the principles (formerly assumed) of the so-called “theory 
of semantical categories”, but there are further, although minor, non-substantial 
discrepancies between both editions. Besides a slight divergence in the titles (the Polish 
one means literally the same as ‘the concept of truth in the languages of the deductive 
sciences’), here are three further examples of differences, chosen at random: (1) footnote 
59 of B35 does not preserve the original ordering of the opening sentences of its 
counterpart in T33: the Polish note begins with the phrase ‘Przy tej interpretacji terminu 
“funktor” ’, but in the German note the corresponding phrase―‘Bei derjenigen 
Interpretation des Terminus “Funktor” ’―occurs only in the fifth line; (2) the sentence 
‘eine solche Funktion wollen wir als Anführungsfunktion bezeichnen’, which occurs in 
§1 of B35 (and which Woodger renders as ‘we shall call such functions quotation-
functions’) has no counterpart in T33; and (3) a textbook on set theory by Sierpiński 
which is listed in the bibliography of T33, and mentioned in footnote 77, does not occur 
in the bibliography of B35; in the corresponding footnote 77 of the German edition, 
reference is made instead to the third edition of Fraenkel’s Einleitung in die 
Mengenlehre.
29
 
As to the differences between B35 and W56, they are peripheral and mainly concern 
some footnotes. Perhaps the most remarkable and noteworthy example is footnote 56, 
which was drastically shortened by Tarski in the English edition.
30
 It is a very special 
footnote: it contains a striking statement, viz. that the language of Leśniewski’s “complete 
system of mathematical logic” is not to be counted among the formalized languages for 
which Tarski’s method of defining the concept of truth and other semantical concepts is 
given. Tarski wrote that Leśniewski’s system is “the only complete system of 
mathematical logic, as far as I know, whose formalization—in contrast to, for instance, 
the system of Whitehead-Russell—is unobjectionable and exhibits perfect precision.”31 
This far, so good: Tarski is praising his relatively unknown teacher’s work while 
criticizing the world renowned Principia Mathematica.  
But then he goes on to say “unfortunately, that system [sc. Leśniewski’s] seems to me, 
in virtue of certain specific characteristics, an especially unrewarding object for 
methodological and semantical investigations.”32 A few lines after, he excludes 
Leśniewski’s system from the family of “formalized” sciences, in the technical sense he 
calls ‘formalized’: “From a formal point of view, it would be actually hard to fit that 
system under the general characterization of the formalized deductive sciences given at 
the beginning of §2.”33 Eventually, Tarski concludes: “In order to adapt Leśniewski’s 
system, under these circumstances, to the requirements of the present investigations, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
28
 Kalinowski’s 1972 French translation of Tarski’s monograph provides the reader with a systematic guide 
to the differences between T33, B35, and W56, by means of a system of comparison used in the text itself. 
29
 Sierpiński’s book is Zarys teorji mnogości—Część pierwsza: Liczby pozaskończone (‘An outline of set 
theory—First part: transfinite numbers’, 1928). The 1933/1956 corresponding footnote is footnote 1 
(p.234). 
30
 39 lines in B35 down to only 14 lines in 1933/1956 [footnote 2, p. 210]. 
31
 “… das einzige mir bekannte vollständige System der mathematischen Logik, dessen 
Formalisierung―im Gegensatz z.B. zum System Whitehead-Russell―keine Einwände zulässt und 
vollkommene Präzision aufweist.”  
32
 “… leider scheint mir dieses System wegen gewisser spezifischer Eigentümlichkeiten ein überaus 
undankbares Objekt für methodologische und semantische Untersuchungen zu sein.” 
33
 “Formal gennomen würde es sogar schwer fallen, dieses System der allgemeinen, am Anfang des §2 
gegebenen Charackterisierung der formalisierten deduktiven Wissenschaften unterzuordnen.”  
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would have to be subjected to a quite thorough reworking, which, however, would fall 
entirely outside the framework of this work.” 34 This is a striking statement, which almost 
contradicts the praise initially made. Unfortunately, however, reference to Leśniewski’s 
system has been entirely removed from the corresponding 1933/1956 footnote.
35
 
Given this state of affairs (existence of some minor textual differences plus double 
possibility of mistranslation), the reader of the English edition of Tarski’s truth-definition 
paper should be cautious. When confronted with an intractable or awkward passage in 
1933/1956, we should always ask two natural questions, before attributing to Tarski 
himself some inadequacy: 
 
Is Woodger’s passage P faithful to Blaustein’s corresponding passage P’ (if there is such)? By 
its turn, is Blaustein’s passage P’ faithful to Tarski’s original passage P” (if there is such)? 
 
This trace-back strategy may appear as a hermeneutic platitude, but it is worth being 
explicitly stressed here. For the intriguing claim we have been considering in Tarski 
1933/1956—that condition beta “is not essential”―might well be the result of a 
mistranslation, either from B35 to W56, or else from T33 to B35; still, the claim itself 
might as well have no counterpart in B35 or T33. So let us look more closely to the 
German and Polish editions in order to see whether one of these possibilities is indeed the 
case.
36
  
 
5.2 The German and Polish editions 
 
To begin with, let us observe that Tarski’s claim is not the result of adding to the 
English edition a passage which has no counterpart in the German or Polish editions. 
There is such a counterpart in both the 1933 and 1935 texts, as we will see below. But 
before checking this point, let us further remark that, at least with respect to Tarski’s 
“preceding two sentences”, Woodger’s translation seems to be faithful to Blaustein’s text. 
And the same holds for Blaustein’s version: it also seems to be faithful to Tarski’s 
original Polish.  
                                                 
34
 “Um unter diesen Umständen das System Leśniewski’s den Bedürfnissen der vorliegenden 
Untersuchungen anzupassen, müsste es einer recht gründlichen Umarbeitung unterzogen werden, was 
jedoch den Rahmen dieser Arbeit vollständig sprengen würde.”  
35
 The Polish/German footnote 56 did not go unnoticed by some scholars. See Sundholm 1993, Sundholm 
2003 and also Philippe de Rouilhan, ‘Tarski et l’universalité de la logique’, in Frédéric Nef/Denis Vernant 
(éd.), Le formalism en question—le tournant des anées 30, J. Vrin, 1998. Some readers might think at first 
that one cannot define the concept of truth for the language of Leśniewski’s “complete system of 
mathematical logic” for reasons quite analogous to the reasons given in the informal proof of Theorem I in 
§5 (which concerns the language of what Tarski there calls “the general theory of classes”). But the reasons 
are in a deeper level. Not even an axiomatic semantics as delineated by Tarski’s method (neither in the 
form of an axiomatic theory of truth nor of any other semantical theory) is available for Leśniewski’s 
language—or any of its “fragments”. Leśniewski’s language belongs to a wholly distinct kind of 
regimented languages. As odd as it may seem, we should repeat that Tarski explicitly says that 
Leśniewski’s language is not a “formalized” language.  
 
36
 In order to avoid complication we are disregarding here some changes that took place in the second 
edition of LSM (there are some differences between W56 in Tarski 1956 and W56 in Tarski 1983. For two 
examples, compare footnotes 1 and 2 on page 174 in Tarski 1956, with the same footnotes on the same 
page in Tarski 1983. The reader should be aware of these differences. 
 17 
As in section 4, let us omit for convenience certain temporarily extraneous words from 
the German and Polish passages corresponding to Tarski’s “preceding two sentences”. 
Then, from Blaustein’s edition, we get: 
 
Von einer […] Definition der wahren Aussage soll man […] nicht viel mehr verlangen, als 
dass sie […] alle Teildefinitionen von diesem Typus […] umfasse […]; höchstens kann man 
noch verlangen, dass zum Umfang des definierten Begriffs ausschliesslich Aussagen gehören 
[…]. 
 
And, from the Polish original edition, we get the following: 
 
Od […] definicji zdania prawdziwego nie należy […] o wiele więcej wymagać ponad to, by 
[…] obejmowała wszystkie cząstkowe definicje tego typu […]; conajwyżej można jeszcze 
żądać, by do zakresu zdefinjowanego pojęcia należały wyłącznie zdania [...].37 
 
The German phrase ‘nicht viel mehr […] als’ and the Polish phrase ‘nie […] o wiele 
więcej […] ponad to’ contribute to the meaning of their contexts exactly as the English 
phrase ‘not much more […] than’ contribute to the meaning of the first of Tarski’s 
“preceding two sentences”. Thus, the German and Polish counterparts of the first of the 
“preceding two sentences” similarly imply that something more is needed than what is 
stated in condition alpha. Now, the German ‘höchstens’ and the Polish ‘conajwyżej’ 
(today spelled ‘co najwyżej’) mean essentially the same as the English adverbial phrase 
‘at most’. Therefore, the German and Polish counterparts of the second of the “preceding 
two sentences” similarly imply that what is stated in condition beta would be a sufficient 
supplement to alpha.
38
  
The critical passage is Tarski’s “following sentence”, the context of the claim that 
condition beta “is not essential”. What we find in the German and Polish corresponding 
excerpts? Again, let us omit for convenience certain temporarily extraneous words from 
them. Making some minor adjustments for the sake of readability, we get the following: 
 
[…] der zweite Teil obiger Konvention [besitzt] keine wesentliche Bedeutung […]: sobald die 
Metasprache […] die Bedingung (α) befriedigt, kann man leicht ein neues Symbol „Wr’ “ 
definieren, welches ausserdem die Bedingung (β) erfüllt; […] [nehmen wir an], dass Wr’ der 
gemeinsame Teil der Klassen Wr und As ist. 
 
In the same fashion, from the Polish original edition, we get: 
 
[…] druga część powyższej umowy nie posiada istotnego znaczenia: z chwilą 
gdy […] [metajęzik] […] [czyni] zadość warunkowi (α), można z łatwością 
                                                 
37
 We are especially indebted here to Magda Stroińska, David Hitchcock, James Smith, and Andrew 
McFarland, for kindly helping us with the abbreviation and adjustments in the Polish passages quoted in 
this section. We also benefitted from the research reported in Hitchcock and Stroińska 2002. 
38
 In the entry for ‘najwyżej’ in Stanisławski’s Wielki Słownik polsko-angielski, one reads ‘at (the very) 
most’ as the English phrase corresponding to the Polish ‘co najwyżej’. This is stronger than ‘at most’, but 
does not alter significantly the content of the passage. Rather, it seems to reinforce our affirmation that the 
second of Tarski’s “preceding two sentences” does not strictly speaking imply that the full strength of beta 
is necessary. 
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zdefinjować nowy symbol „Vr’ “, który ponadto spełnia warunek (β); […] 
[przyjmijmy], że Vr’ jest to część wspólna klas Vr i S. 
 
As said above, the statement that condition beta “is not essential” has a counterpart in 
both the 1933 and 1935 editions of Tarski’s truth-definition paper. The German 
corresponding phrase is ‘besitzt keine wesentliche Bedeutung’, and Tarski’s original 
phrase is ‘nie posiada istotnego znaczenia’.  
First of all, it is interesting to note that Woodger’s ‘is not essential’ is not a literal 
translation of Blaustein’s version. In particular, it leaves out the word ‘Bedeutung’. 
Translating literally the German phrase would give us something like ‘has no essential 
meaning’. Blaustein carefully preserves the structure of Tarski’s original phrase—putting, 
in particular, ‘Bedeutung’ for the Polish ‘znaczenia’ (nominative: ‘znaczenie’). A direct 
translation from the 1933 passage into English would also give us something like ‘has no 
essential meaning’ (maybe ‘has no essential significance’). Be that as it may, leaving out 
‘Bedeutung’ (and, indirectly, ‘znaczenia’)—does it have any serious interpretive effect at 
all? Whether one says that condition beta “is not essential”, or whether one says that it 
“has no essential meaning” (or “significance”), our problem seems to remain untouched. 
We still do not know what this claim amounts to.
39
  
Incidentally, a word of caution is in order here: do not take the terms ‘Bedeutung’ and 
‘znaczenie’, as used by Tarski here and elsewhere in his monograph, with any technical 
and precise philosophical content. Blaustein seems to follow the implicit rule of 
translating in most cases ‘znaczenie’ as ‘Bedeutung’, and ‘sens’ as ‘Sinn’. But there is 
absolutely no technical distinction presupposed here—let alone, as one could think at first, 
a tacit adoption of a theory of meaning like Frege’s. If one reads the Polish original, one 
notes the fact that Tarski uses interchangeably ‘sens’ and ‘znaczenie’ in quite similar 
contexts, a fact which by itself indicates that the intended distinction is a merely stylistic 
one.   
The focus of the problem relates to the word ‘essential’. In what sense of ‘essential’ did 
Tarski intend to say that condition beta “is not essential” or, if one prefers a literal 
translation, “has no essential meaning”? Again, checking the German and Polish passages 
does not shed much light on the issue. For ‘essential’ is a faithful version of ‘wesentlich’, 
which by its turn is a faithful version of ‘istotny’ (‘istotnego’ is the genitive singular 
form). There is no mistranslation here with respect to these words. But remind that 
Tarski’s “following sentence” has two clauses, the second of which seems to be an 
explanation of (or a sketchy argument for) the first clause. Perhaps Woodger mistranslated 
Blaustein’s second clause, or else Blaustein mistranslated Tarski’s original second clause. 
Once again, checking the source passages shows that there are no substantive 
translational problems. Blaustein’s German second clause translates almost literally the 
Polish corresponding passage. Some puristic criticism might target ‘sobald’ (“as soon as”) 
and point out that it is not literal for ‘z chwilą gdy’ (“at the moment [when]”), but this 
would be irrelevant to our problem. As to Woodger’s translation, it is not as literal as the 
                                                 
39
 In a personal communication, Magda Stroińska and David Hitchcock remarked to us that “in the phrase 
‘istotnego znaczenia’, which literally means ‘essential meaning’ and is in the genitive case, the word 
‘znaczenia’ adds very little semantic content”.  They remarked further that the phrase is common Polish for 
‘essential’. In conclusion, they said that “Woodger’s translation without the word ‘meaning’ seems quite 
faithful to the Polish original, and Blaustein’s use of the word ‘Bedeutung’ seems a bit over-literal”. We are 
again indebted to them for this valuable and kind assistance. 
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German rendition. One remarkable feature of the English sentence is Woodger’s choice of 
uniformly using the verb ‘satisfy’, which translates two German verbs used in the source 
text, ‘befriedigen’ (Blaustein’s choice for ‘czynić zadość’) and ‘erfüllen’ (Blaustein’s 
rendering of ‘spełniać’). But in the German version, as in the original Polish, ‘befriedigen’ 
and ‘erfüllen’ (‘czynić zadość’ and ‘spełniać’) are used as mere stylistic variants, as would 
be, for instance, ‘satisfy’, ‘fulfill’, and ‘comply with’ in English. No material question is 
raised by Woodger’s choice of ‘satisfy’ to translate two interchangeable verbs in the 
source paper.
40
 
We finish our somewhat lengthy discussion in this section by suggesting the following 
conclusion: the awkwardness of the claim that condition beta “is not essential” (or “has 
no essential meaning”) is also present in the German and Polish editions. If we are not 
wrong, the strangeness of Tarski’s statement is not the result of a mistranslation. We 
should approach the problem from a different viewpoint.  
 
 
 
6. Observations about Tarski 1933/1956, pp. 186-189. 
 
The extension of the two concepts [sc. true and provable] is thus not identical. 
—Tarski 1933/1956, p. 186.  
In order to predicate ‘not identical’ a plural is needed. ‘Socrates is not identical’ 
is a favorite example of incoherency. Tarski wants to say that the two concepts 
are not coextensive; he needs ‘the extensions …are’: The extensions of the two 
concepts are thus not identical. Did Corcoran miss this? 
—John Michael Herring 1985, personal communication. 
 
 Alfred Tarski’s writings have been justly praised for their meticulous precision, 
clarity, and rigor. Indeed, many passages in Tarski 1933/1956 are paradigms of such 
virtues.
41
 Unfortunately however, these properties are not routinely exemplified in the 
                                                 
40
 The metacalculus developed in MLC contains explicitly 5 axioms, 12 lemmas, 32 definitions, and 28 
theorems. It is a rather remarkable fact, easily rectifiable, that the verb “to satisfy” is used as an undefined 
semantical term belonging to MLC’s vocabulary in the statement of two axioms, several definitions, and 
one lemma in Tarski 1933/1956. In order to undo the appearance of circularity (in fact, there would be 
none), Woodger carefully avoids using “to satisfy” in Def. 22 as an undefined MLC term. Inadvertently   
however, he uses this same verb in the alternative definition of satisfaction in footnote 1 on page 193 and in 
Def. 24. Woodger’s conscious manoeuver has no counterpart in the German or Polish. Blaustein uses the 
verb “erfüllen” twice in Def. 22 as part of the defined expression ‘die Folge f erfüllt die Aussagefunktion x’ 
and as an informal metalanguage semantical verb in the phrase ‘welche eine von den vier folgenden 
Bedingungen erfüllen’, which immediately follows it. The same slip is in Def. 24, but not in the alternative 
definition of satisfaction, where he uses “erfüllen” in the defined expression and “genügen” in the 
immediately following phrase. In the Polish, Tarski is more meticulous: he finds a way out different from 
Woodger’s. Instead of using the verb “spełniać” twice, he resorts to “spełniać” in the defined expression, 
‘ciąg f spełnia funkcję zdaniową x’, and to the informally synonymous semantical verb, “czynić zadość” in 
the phrase Blaustein translates ‘welche eine von den vier folgenden Bedingungen erfüllen’. The same 
manoeuver is used by Tarski in the alternative definition of the notion of satisfaction, and in Def. 24. By the 
way, although OLC remains the same (apart from typographic differences) throughout T33, B35, and W56, 
its corresponding metalanguages change. MLC is not OLC’s metalanguage in the German and Polish 
monographs. 
41
 One famous example is the last paragraph on page 192 giving the truth-condition for universal 
quantification. Another, perhaps almost as important but much less well known, is the rarely mentioned fact 
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crucially important Section 3 of Tarski 1933/1956. Our unhappy task in this part of our 
paper—begun in the above epigraph—is to justify our sadly negative accusation. 
 In the first sentence, Tarski uses the expression ‘the construction of the definition 
of true sentence’—italicizing the expression ‘true sentence’ in the context following ‘the 
definition of’. It requires some study and interpretation to determine what role the italics 
are intended to play: whether he is referring to a definition of the concept of true 
sentence, a definition of the extension (or truth-set) of the concept of true sentence, a 
definition of the expression ‘true sentence’, definition of the extension of the expression 
‘true sentence’, definition of the sense or meaning of the expression ‘true sentence’, a 
definition of the property of being a true sentence, or something else entirely.
42
 He seems 
to be implying that it would be improper to use the expression ‘definition of true 
sentence’ without italics—an expression having marginal status as non-elliptical 
grammatical English. After all, Tarski has already sensitized the reader to use-mention 
confusions and to other similar confusions. Moreover, as already mentioned, English 
does not allow using a common noun phrase as a proper name of its extension: ‘dog’ 
cannot be used to denote the class of dogs—without introducing a nonce convention.43
 Nevertheless the expression ‘definition of true sentence’ without italics occurs 
twice on this page: lines 11 and 20. In this section, the expression ‘definition of’ followed 
by an italicized noun or noun phrase never occurs again—but followed by an unitalicized 
noun or noun phrase it occurs several time. 
 The second sentence is the following. 
 
It might appear at first sight that at the present stage of our discussion this problem can be solved without 
further difficulty, that 'true sentence' with respect to the language of a formalized deductive science means 
nothing other than 'provable theorem', and that consequently Def. 17 is already a, definition of truth and 
moreover a purely structural one. 
 
 Where do we begin? In the first place, there is no justification for saying that one 
common noun phrase means another. Perhaps by ‘means nothing other than’, Tarski 
intends ‘means the same as’. Perhaps by ‘means nothing other than “provable theorem”’, 
Tarski intends ‘means nothing other than what “provable theorem” means’. Anyway, 
some change is needed. In the second place, the expression ‘provable theorem’ is a 
glaring pleonasm: comparable to ‘female women’ or ‘canine dog’. That expression had 
never before occurred in Tarski’s writings and it never occurs in later writings. When 
Tarski introduced ‘provable’ (1956, p. 182), he used the expression ‘x is a provable 
(accepted) sentence or a theorem’. Perhaps ‘provable theorem’ was intended to be -
‘provable sentence’ or perhaps ‘theorem’. 
 Farther down the same page Tarski writes the following. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that Tarski meticulously uses the clausal form as opposed to the assertoric form of sentences that are used 
as components of compound sentence. The sentence ‘it is snowing’ does not begin with an uppercase nor 
does it end with a period (Corcoran 2006, pp. 226f and Corcoran 2009). 
42
 By a definition of the concept of true sentence one might understand a sentence such as ‘the concept of 
true sentence is […]’ or maybe ‘x is the concept of true sentence iff […]’. 
43
 This is reminiscent of some confusion rife in Boolean era logic, e.g. thinking that ‘Every dog is an 
animal’ is not about dogs and animals but about classes.  
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The extension of the two concepts is thus not identical. From the intuitive standpoint all provable sentences 
are without doubt true sentences (the Defs. 13-17 of § 2 were formulated with that in mind). Thus the 
definition of true sentence which we are seeking must also cover sentences which are not provable.VIII.3 
186.16 
 
The first of these three sentences was dealt with in the epigraph. The second could be 
shortened to read simply ‘all provable sentences are true sentences’. The third sentence 
uses roman type where italic is required, it uses the previously undefined expression ‘the 
definition … must also cover sentences which are not provable’, and, most importantly, it 
suggests—contrary to Tarski’s own previous disclaimer—that a definition of truth tells us 
which sentences are true. What he should say is simply that we cannot get a definition of 
true sentence simply by replacing ‘provable sentence’ by ‘true sentence’ in Definition 
17.
44
 
 On the next page, p.187, we meet Convention T: 
 
CONVENTION T. A formally correct definition of the symbol ‘Tr’, formulated in the metalanguage, 
will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has the following consequences: 
 
As mentioned above, ‘formally correct’ is meaningless filler. Not only does it detract 
from the clarity of the statement, it throws the reader off balance by suggesting, if only 
for a moment, that the reader should turn back a few pages to find out the difference 
between a formally correct definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ and a definition of the symbol 
‘Tr’. Next, what is formulated in the metalanguage doing here? All such definitions are 
metalanguage sentences. And even if there is some useful purpose for in the 
metalanguage , surely formulated is filler. Moreover, the repetition of ‘definition’ makes 
the reader wonder whether ‘adequate definition of truth’ could just as well be reduced to 
‘adequate’. Making these changes would result in the following. 
 
CONVENTION T*. A definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ will be called adequate if it has the following 
consequences: 
 
Further, after meticulously using ‘if and only if’ in definition after definition, the reader is 
perplexed to find ‘if’ standing alone. Why not ‘if and only if’? Lastly, the will be called is 
hardly the verb for a postulate. It is not even the verb for a definition: is called is the 
usual verb. Incidentally, if Convention T is intended as a definition in the meta-language 
of the meta-language MLC, then why is it not called a definition? Making these new 
changes produces the following. 
 
CONVENTION T**. A definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ is called adequate if and only if it has the 
following consequences: 
 
Another alternative would be the following.  
                                                 
44
 Tarski introduced ‘provable’ (1956, p. 182) using expression ‘x is a provable (accepted) sentence or a 
theorem’. According to accepted conventions, this should be replaced by ‘x is a provable sentence’. Tarski 
has no interest in defining the expression ‘provable (accepted) sentence or in defining ‘accepted sentence’, 
an expression not used in this monograph. Besides, there are infinitely many provable sentences only 
finitely many of which have been accepted: ‘accepted’ cannot be a synonym for ‘provable’ and it is a 
mistake to stipulate that it is. 
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DEFINITION T***. A definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ is adequate if and only it has the following 
consequences: 
 
Why did Tarski select the form printed and not some other?  
 
Two pages later (Tarski 1933/1956, p.188) we read the following two-sentence 
paragraph that immediately follows Convention T and that has already been mentioned 
previously in our discussion. 
 
It should be noted that the second part of the above convention is not essential; so long as the metalanguage 
already has the symbol 'Tr' which satisfies the condition (α), it is easy to define a new symbol ‘Tr'’ which 
also satisfies the condition (β). It suffices for this purpose to agree that Tr' is the common part of the classes 
Tr and S. 
 
There are several independent criticisms to be made of the first sentence following 
Convention T; we explicitly refrain from making all of them, even all that we know of. 
Note the “new symbol” ‘Tr'’ [sc. accenting the symbol 'Tr']. 
Taken literally, Tarski’s statement is what is known colloquially as “a flaming 
non-sequitur”. There is no sense of ‘essential’ known to us—or to any of the dozens of 
native English speakers we consulted—that makes sense here. The fact, if such it is—that 
a definition satisfying beta also is easy to construct from one satisfying alpha—has no 
bearing on whether beta is essential for any given purpose. Were the expression ‘not 
essential’ changed to something like ‘not difficult to satisfy once alpha has been 
satisfied’, we could begin to deal with Tarski’s statement. 
Notice that Tarski’s expression ‘to define a new symbol ‘Tr'’ which also satisfies 
the condition (β)’ cannot be taken literally: it is not a symbol satisfying beta that is at 
issue but a definition satisfying beta. Perhaps Tarski wanted something like ‘to construct 
a new definition which uses a new symbol ‘Tr'’ and which also satisfies the condition 
(β)’. 
However, the new expression Tarski suggests is evidently the following. 
 
Tr' is the common part of the classes Tr and S. 
 
But this is not a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’. In fact it is not even a sentence of MLC. It 
is an expression in another language: one gotten from MLC by adding a new symbol 
‘Tr'’—accenting ‘Tr’. Moreover, since no meaning has been attached to the accented 
‘Tr'’, the new expression has no truth-value. 
Incidentally, Tarski’s expression ‘It suffices for this purpose to agree …’ is 
unnecessarily inexact and misleading to beginners and others not accustomed to how 
mathematicians write informally. No agreeing or disagreeing is relevant: we are talking 
about manipulating strings of characters. 
What Tarski might have had in mind is taking a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ 
satisfying alpha and changing the right side into a conjunction of the old right side with ‘x 
is a sentence’. This would yield a definition of the symbol ‘Tr’ in MLC—an expression 
having the required form and devoid of any new symbol. Further, if the old definition 
were true, the new one would be as well. 
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But, it is not clear—to us at least—whether beta would be satisfied by the new 
definition or even whether alpha would be satisfied.   
To conclude this section we can say that we have demonstrated a pattern of 
careless, inexact, and overly elliptical writing in this section. Compare Corcoran 2013. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Do not forget that philosophical writings are artifacts; they are not the reality that 
philosophy is about. Do not become like the archeologists who inadvertently 
spend their time studying the debris left by previous archeologists. 
— Frango Nabrasa, 2001, personal communication. 
 
 
 We have demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no way to conclude 
from Tarski’s statements apparently retracting his inclusion of condition beta that he 
indeed intended to limit Convention T’s conditions to alpha alone. In fact, evidence 
points to no intentions to eliminate beta. On the contrary, retraction of condition beta 
would call into question the sincerity of Tarski’s repeated statements that the range of 
applicability of truth in a given context is the set of sentences of a fixed formalized 
language given in advance. We can only purpose that Tarski misspoke when he 
apparently retracted condition beta. Anyway, no responsible person could justify omitting 
condition beta in their own definition of adequacy by citing Tarski as an authority—at 
least not the Tarski of 1933/1956.  
 Our studies took us into unexplored corners of Tarski’s thought and uncovered 
many questions to explore in the future. We raised more questions than we answered. 
Many of our answers were hedged or labeled as speculation. Contrary to our hopes and 
expectations, our investigations revealed incoherencies, non sequiturs, obscurities, 
redundancies, misleading passages, and other flaws not previously identified in print. 
However, we did not and would not question the importance and general rigor widely 
attributed to Tarski’s 1933/1956 work.  
Tarski’s writings are portrayed as a rich source of historical, philosophical, 
linguistic, and sociological problems. We hope that our paper will help to make 
interpretational study of Tarski’s logical work to become as extensive, rich, and 
rewarding as interpretational study of Aristotle’s logical work has become since 
Łukasiewicz brought it to the attention of the logically informed world. 
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